Abstract
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a consensus has emerged among economists that credibility is a paramount issue for monetary policy. For developed economies, the key element in a credible commitment to price stability is delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a clearly specified inflation target, associated with sanctions when the target is not met (Persson and Tabellini, 1993) . For developing countries, in contrast, the debate continues on what commitment mechanisms are both appropriate and feasible. A first view embodied in many IMF stabilization programs in Sub-Saharan Africa is that floating exchange rates together with a greater independence of central banks would ensure credible monetary policies (Schadler, 1995) . The alternative view is that for many African countries the only way to rebuild poor reputations is to establish policy rules at the regional level within the framework of a monetary union, possibly with the participation of advanced industrial countries (Collier, 1991) .
The debate over which mechanism African governments should use in order to increase their credibility is all the more central in light of current regional integration initiatives. In East Africa a new treaty paving the way for a common market followed by a planned (1993) , and a proposed revision to the Lomé agreements which could enhance regional cooperation within Africa along the lines of the NAFTA agreement (European Union, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1996) .
The main economic argument for adopting floating exchange rates and independent central banks, instead of a monetary union, is that current and proposed African monetary unions do not constitute optimum currency areas. For one, the transaction cost benefits of removing exchange rate volatility within an area are likely to be small for countries that trade relatively little with one another. Second, the loss of the nominal exchange rate instrument could potentially represent a very significant cost for countries hit by asymmetric shocks. Even in the Rand Monetary Area where Jenkins and Thomas (1998) found evidence of relative convergence in the eighties, output disturbances are hardly correlated (Bayoumi and Ostry, 1997) . The adverse effects of large asymmetric shocks are reinforced by the difficulty in implementing real adjustments. Labor flows from large to small economies are unlikely to compensate for negative shocks occurring in the larger economies, downward price rigidities have proved significant, and fiscal transfers that are already difficult to operate in the context of the European Union are not a practical option for African economies. Moreover, the asymmetric character of shocks is exacerbated for African monetary unions with an external peg. In the CFA Zone, French monetary policy is obviously unaffected by shocks arising in the Western and Central monetary unions. With the de facto peg to the Euro since January 1999, shocks in the African communities will be even more asymmetric to the conduct of monetary policy by the European Central Bank.
The problem with optimum currency area theory is that it assumes that if a government retains the nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument, it will only devalue (or revalue) when the action is warranted by economic considerations (Eichengreen, 1994) . In practice, however, factors such as political instability can greatly increase the likelihood that a country will devalue, independently of whether economic considerations warrant such a move (Klein and Marion, 1996) . In the extreme case of an environment of low monetary policy credibility, governments may gain nothing from retaining the nominal exchange rate as a policy tool, because devaluation will simply start a wage inflation spiral.
Another problem with the recommendation that African countries adopt floating exchange rates and independent central banks is that legal central bank independence in the political context of most African countries is likely to be meaningless. In order for the granting of legal independence to a central bank to promote credibility, there must be significant obstacles to reversing this decision. Keefer and Stasavage (1998) have recently shown that political institutions characterized by checks and balances are an important obstacle to reversal of legal central bank independence. The problem is that few African countries have political institutions characterized by significant checks and balances. We provide evidence to support this conclusion and then argue that participation in international agreements may be the best way for African countries to increase their credibility. In order for this solution to be effective, however, exit from international arrangements must also be costly, and we provide evidence to show that participation in parallel international agreements is one factor likely to increase the cost of exit. Finally, we make suggestions on how the rules of these unions could be designed so as to maximize the probability of adherence and so as to mitigate the adverse impact of asymmetric shocks.
We develop our theoretical framework in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 review the experience of three African monetary unions: Section 3 documents the relative absence of domestic checks and balances and the evolution of monetary rules in these unions while Section 4 evaluates their credibility. Section 5 concludes with some specific institutional issues on the design of monetary unions in Africa.
CREDIBLE MONETARY POLICIES

Factors that undermine credibility
There are at least two grounds on which credibility problems can emerge with respect to monetary policy. The best known is time-inconsistency. Kydland and Prescott (1977) show that even a social-welfare maximizing government will have an incentive to deviate from an announced monetary policy once private sector actors have formed expectations and entered into wage and other contracts. With less well-intended governments that are ready to retain power even at the expense of sub-optimal economic policies, the possibility for time-inconsistency problems expands accordingly. A common example of the latter is the increased incentive for governments to engage in surprise monetary expansions before elections.
Even if a current government is pursuing a prudent monetary policy, a second credibility problem can emerge if investors fear that future governments will not have the same preferences as a current government. Changes in government can bring to the fore interest groups whose demands for subsidies lead to ill-advised macroeconomic policies. A common example of a powerful lobby in contemporary Africa are demobilized soldiers whose requests for transfers may conflict with a government's macroeconomic objectives but whose interests often cannot be easily ignored.
Mechanisms that enhance credibility
Apart from acquiring a reputation, which is a lengthy process, the common suggestion for governments facing credibility problems is to tie their hands, either by creating a policy rule or by delegating to an independent agent. Early literature generally assumes that once in place, rules or delegation are immutable (Rogoff, 1985; Walsh, 1995) . However, formal independence for central banks, inflation contracts for central bankers, or even exchange rate rules are likely to remain a dead letter if they can be reneged on with little cost. As evidence of this, Cukierman's (1992) study shows that even though African countries score better than average on an index of legal central bank independence, it seems to have little bearing on their inflation performance.
In this paper, we follow more recent work which has emphasized that delegating or adopting a rule will not pose a constraint on a government's actions unless the decision to do so is more difficult to reverse than would be a reversal of the underlying macroeconomic policies implied by the respect of the rule (Moser, 1996; Lohmann, 1998; Keefer and Stasavage, 1998) . Keefer and Stasavage develop a theory of how the credibility of rules and of delegation depends upon the existence of checks and balances in a country's political institutions. Checks and balances include features such as having both executive and legislature able to veto legislation, having multiple houses of the legislature, or a tendency to have legislative majorities made up of multiple parties with different preferences. In addition to these formal characteristics of political institutions, however, in order for checks and balances to be present, it is also critical that different actors within government (like the executive and legislative majority) have heterogeneous preferences.
Keefer and Stasavage provide cross-country statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that under the above conditions, legal central bank independence is more likely to increase credibility.
For countries in which checks and balances are absent, joining an international agreement might act as a substitute mechanism for establishing credibility 1 . In order for international agreements to be effective, however, exit must be costly and other member states must also be willing to oppose any attempt by their neighbors to break the rules of the arrangement.
Costs of exit from a monetary union can include the administrative costs involved in setting-up a separate currency, the difficulty of running an independent monetary policy with a low level of foreign reserves, or increased debt-servicing obligations. Ultimately, however, a more important deterrent to exit may be the fear of losing benefits in parallel regional agreements in areas such as trade or security. We investigate this proposition for three different African monetary unions.
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A further step is to base an international agreement on delegation to an international agency whose decision makers will themselves be independent from control by any government, as will be the case in the European Central Bank. This is not applicable to the monetary unions considered in this paper, however, because ministerial representatives have dominated the governing boards of the monetary authorities. . In this section we consider in turn the political institutions present in these countries and the evolution of monetary rules in each union. 
AFRICAN MONETARY UNIONS
The existence of checks and balances
Following Keefer and Stasavage (1998) in tables 2, 3, and 4, we use two variables to proxy for the degree of check and balances: the degree of political party fractionalization and an index of constraints on the executive. Fractionalization in the lower house of a country's parliament is measured on a 0 to 1.0 scale with an index which is calculated using the same formula frequently adopted for measuring concentration in industrial sectors (Banks, 1993) .
In countries where fractionalization is high (tending towards 1.0) there will be a greater tendency for coalition governments to form. It is likely to be more costly to renege on policy rules within coalition governments, as suggested in section 2, because multiple decision-makers must agree to such a change whereas monetary policy decisions would normally be made by the executive alone. The index of "executive constraints" developed 2
We do not cover the whole spectrum of monetary regimes in Africa that ranges from currency boards or monetary unions, to a single currency peg, to a peg to a basket of currencies, to a float within a predetermined range with heavy intervention, to a pure float (Ghosh et al., 1997) .
by Gurr et al. (1989) is a subjective indicator of the extent to which the executive in a country is constrained by features such as a constitution and a separate legislature which can veto legislation. The index ranges from the lowest value (1), where "there are no regular limitations on the executive's actions", to the highest value (7), where groups such as a legislature or a ruling party have "effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity".
It seems clear from the tables below that for the period studied here African countries have had an increasing tendency towards low party fractionalization and low levels of executive constraints. This is most marked among the CFA states where executive constraints have averaged less than 3.0 on Gurr's scale and where levels of fractionalization approaching zero reflect the emergency of single-party states. There are two major exceptions to this pattern: Uganda and Botswana. Uganda had a fairly high level of party fractionalization during the 1961-66 period, combined with strong executive constraints. In Botswana there was also a large number of parties with two main political parties dominating the political scene. Sources: Banks (1993) , Gurr and Jaggers (1989) . Sources: Banks (1993) , Gurr and Jaggers (1989) . Sources: Banks (1993) , Gurr and Jaggers (1989) .
The evolution of rules
All three monetary unions we consider here began as rule-based systems characterized by a fixed exchange rate peg with full convertibility, strict limits on central bank lending to governments, and minimum legal levels of foreign reserves 3 . Subsequently, there have been modifications in each union.
The East African Currency Board (EACB) was the continuation of a monetary arrangement set-up by the British colonial power in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Though the statutes of the EACB did not specify a legal minimum for reserves, convertibility for the East African shilling issued by the EACB was ensured by a 100% reserve cover. Gradually, the EACB also assumed the lending functions of a central bank.
In 1955, it was authorized to back a small portion of its foreign reserves with East African government securities denominated in East African shillings. Possibilities for the EACB to lend to governments and the private sector were gradually increased so that by 1964, if it had been fully used, the £45 million fiduciary issue would have amounted to more than 50% of the currency in circulation in the newly independent East African states (Kratz, 1966) . In 1960 the governance structure of the EACB was also changed radically as the British government essentially withdrew from direct involvement with Board decisions.
Though there is no record of written voting rules, in practice the Kenyan, Ugandan and
Tanzanian representatives each held a veto over EACB decisions.
Following the break-up of their currency union in 1966, all three East African countries initially retained their fixed peg to the sterling as well as full current account convertibility, but they soon abandoned the fixed peg following sterling's devaluation against the dollar in 1967. They also subsequently restricted convertibility of their new currencies (Gulhati, 1983) . The new national central banks were not particularly independent in that ministerial representatives had substantial influence on their governing boards, but each government did establish rules to either limit central bank lending to governments or to specify a minimum level of reserves 4 .
In the Gabon would name the governor of the BEAC but that Cameroon be given 4 seats on the governing board. These four seats were in many cases sufficient to block any attempt at lowering rediscount ceilings to Cameroonian commercial banks (Stasavage, 1997) .
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When foreign exchange reserves of either bank fell below 20% of demand liabilities, the governing board was to be convened to take adjustment measures. If foreign exchange reserves fell below 10% of demand liabilities, discount rates were to be raised automatically and significant reductions in refinancing to individual countries were to be implemented (IMF, 1963 Conditional credit was made available from the South African Reserve Bank. Swaziland suspended the use of the rand as legal tender and Lesotho took over the management of its own international reserves. When Namibia became independent in 1990, it signed an agreement with South Africa that also provided for Namibia's participation in the CMA, the circulation of the South African rand as legal tender, and for the establishment of Namibia's central bank. Namibia began to issue its own currency (the Namibian dollar) at par with the rand in September 1993.
The CMA committee also provided for consultative meetings on monetary policy, but in practice the rand monetary policy has been determined by the South African Reserve Bank.
Until 1979 the rand was pegged to either Sterling or the US dollar. Contrary to the CFA Zone, capital movements outside the zone were strictly controlled. In 1979, a dual exchange rate system was introduced with the financial rand rate applying to non-resident transactions and direct investment. The South African Reserve Bank directly intervened on the other rate, the commercial rand. The two exchange rates were only unified in 1995.
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South Africa also compensated the smaller countries for the loss of seignorage resulting from the use of the rand and their international reserves were remunerated at market rates of interest.
CREDIBILITY OF AFRICAN MONETARY UNIONS
We assess the credibility of each of the above monetary agreements from three angles: their economic performance, their ability to adjust to political and economic shocks, and the cases of exit from each arrangement. . The Tanzanian government was forced to scale back certain investments (IMF, 1969) and from the end of 1962 on, found itself frequently at or near its limit for borrowing from the EACB. The Ugandan government also found itself in periodic borrowing difficulties with the EACB. As early as 1963, documents show that Ugandan representatives were complaining about the "uncompromising" attitude of the EACB 8 . By contrast, the Kenyan government itself rarely borrowed more than 50% of its fiduciary limit. (Kimei, 1987) . Table 6 shows that there has been low inflation in CFA Zone throughout the various revenues, but even so, direct lending from the two central banks never constituted a rincipal source of deficit finance. Instead, the accumulation of deficits took place through pressuring commercial and development banks into lending to relieve fiscal pressures. The BCEAO and BEAC then engaged in heavy refinancing of these credits and paid little heed to the solvency of the banks to which they were lending. Though refinancing of these credits was cheap (as it took place at heavily subsidised rates), it led to an important crowding out of private credit demand for investment. According to the statutes of both BCEAO and BEAC, much of this indirect lending should have counted towards a government's borrowing ceiling, but it seems clear that this was often not the case.
Economic performance
The rule establishing minimum foreign reserve levels of 20% of sight liabilities should also have limited the expansion of both direct and indirect credit to governments, but in both unions member governments used the latitude provided by the 1973 statutes to avoid taking adjustment measures. In the case of the BCEAO, when gross foreign reserves fell below 20% of sight liabilities the governing board is required to meet to consider what action to take. BCEAO's discount was raised but this was not completely effective since most of BCEAO lending to commercial banks was given through directed credit schemes.
BCEAO's ratio of gross foreign assets to sight liabilities remained under the statutory minimum of 20% for almost the entire period from 1980 to 1994. In the case of the BEAC, gross foreign assets did not fall below the minimum until 1986, but when they did the BEAC governing board delayed in taking action (Stasavage, 1997) .
Data for the Rand Monetary Areas countries presented in Table 7 shows their relatively good inflation and fiscal performance. They also experienced relatively higher investment and growth rates, although these were somewhat reduced after 1977. This good performance resulted from the relative independence of monetary policy in South Africa, due in part to the central bank governors' ten-year term of office, and to the fact that membership of the RMA left little room for independent fiscal and monetary policies in Lesotho and Swaziland. In South Africa, the Reserve Bank pursued the dual objective of stabilising the dollar price of gold and maintaining price stability. As interest rates in smaller RMA countries were broadly in line with those of South Africa, the pass-through of South Africa's inflation was relatively rapid (Tirongo, 1998) .
Botswana is an exception to this pattern as performance improved considerably after it had left the RMA. The government actually became a significant net creditor to the central bank as part of an overall strategy of building up foreign reserves in response to Botswana's diamond boom of the early 1970s. When a severe drought hit Botswana in 1982, the accumulated reserves were able to serve as a buffer. Note, however, that in practice, Botswana's ability to conduct an independent monetary policy from South Africa has been limited. Its inflation record closely follows South African performance, as nearly the totality of South Africa price movements are passed through to Botswana's price index within a year (Atta et al., 1996) . The discretion that Botswana could exercise in this area was also exercised at the cost of imposing heavy capital controls and restrictions on commercial bank reserve holdings. : International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators, IMF (1973) .
Sources
Political and economic shocks
In Tables 8 to 10 , we proxy for political instability with the average frequency of coups d'état and of major cabinet changes over the period of reference. The average annual change in an index of export commodities was taken to reflect major economic shocks 10 .
Whereas the RMA countries were remarkably stable according to our measure, both the EACB and BEAC countries showed significant instability during the initial period of rulebased policies for the EACB and 1960-73 for BEAC) which was nonetheless characterized by a credible commitment to monetary rules resulting in strong inflation and fiscal performance. While the number of cases here is obviously limited, this evidence runs contrary to the predictions of political economy models where political instability is necessarily associated with poorer performance. Sources: Banks (1993) , Deaton and Miller (1997) .
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Evidence on major droughts, another major type of economic shocks, was unfortunately more difficult to gather. Sources: Banks (1993) , Deaton and Miller (1997) . Sources: Banks (1993) , Deaton and Miller (1997) .
Though the economic performance for our three groups of countries was relatively correlated to the changes in the index of export commodities, the case of the CFA countries shows how rules actually amplified the impact of commodity price fluctuations after 1973.
When the CFA states experienced temporary increases in commodity prices in the second half of the 1970s, instead of adopting counter-cyclical policies, they increased their stock of borrowing at the central banks. The CFA states also failed to respond effectively to negative terms of trade shocks, especially to those which many countries suffered after 1985. The increase of fiscal deficit was especially important in the two largest CFA states, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, which were also the hardest hit during that period.
Cases of exit
There were two main obstacles to Tanzania and Uganda exiting the East African Currency
Board. Tanzania had an incentive not to exit the EACB as long as its government believed that integration in areas other than money would result in significant benefits. For the Ugandan government, there were both the incentives of potential gains in other areas of integration, as well as the fact that until 1964 its Prime Minister was constrained by significant checks on his authority within his own country.
When the common market between the three East African territories was preserved at independence, Tanzania in particular hoped to extract concessions from Kenya in the form of subsidies or, at a minimum, through the allocation of rights to produce certain industrial products in exchange for maintaining free trade. There may also have been a hope of deriving benefits from the political federation, which the three East African governments in 1963 announced their intention of creating. Members of the Ugandan government, and its Prime Minister in particular, also hoped that political federation with Kenya might provide access to increased development finance. The problem for the sustainability of the EACB was that Kenya was ultimately not willing to agree to the sort of regional subsidies which the Tanzanian government in particular was demanding. The Kenyan and Ugandan delegations agreed to extend limited trade privileges to Tanzania, but only on the proviso that in exchange Tanzania would formally agree to preserve a common currency. The In 1962 the Malian government decided to create its own currency after a series of disputes with the BCEAO over requests for extensions of credit to government and public enterprises (Julienne, 1987) . Underlying this dispute over lending, however, was the fact that the French colonial administration had given strong support to the PSP party, but an opposing party gained power at independence. Modibo Keita's government made a number of moves to establish close diplomatic relations with Soviet bloc governments and its decision to leave the Franc Zone was accompanied by a distancing of overall relations with Le Monde, 30 November, 1972. share of government's receipts for both Lesotho and Swaziland. Finally, the two countries also gain in that they receive large remittances from labour working in South Africa.
The case of Botswana's departure from the CMA is not consistent with the hypotheses laid out in section 2 to the extent that it was able to leave the CMA without having to also forego the benefits it derived from SACU. Normally, we would expect this selective exiting to be rare. From the point of view of its domestic political institutions, however, the Botswanan decision to opt for discretionary policies and the preservation of prudent macroeconomic policy is consistent with our propositions from section 2. Botswana's political system has been characterized by a number of constitutional limitations on executive authority and a relatively democratic system, and so in practice there has been the sort of checks and balances which could allow for credible commitment in monetary policy via domestic institutions.
DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE PAST
The evidence presented in this paper is that African countries have generally lacked the checks and balances in their political institutions that we suggest are necessary for the conduct of a credible monetary policy commitments at the national level. Little separation of powers existed between executive and legislature, governments for much of the period considered were ruled by single parties, and changes in governments were often extraconstitutional in nature. While the existence of checks and balances in a country's political system is not synonymous with a system with multiple political parties, there is likely to be a fairly high correlation between the two. The re-emergence of multiparty systems in African countries may over time improve possibilities for governments to make credible commitments at the national level, but this development is likely to take time.
In the absence of domestic checks and balances, fear of losing benefits of parallel international agreements has, in many cases, proved sufficient to dissuade governments from exiting a monetary union even when they would have preferred to adopt an independent monetary policy. Two policy recommendations can be derived from these observations. First, while African integration schemes have often suffered from a tendency to be over-ambitious and to recommend integration in a plethora of different areas, there does seem to be a strong logic to accompanying monetary integration with trade integration Three further issues in the institutional design of monetary unions deserve attention: the necessity to mitigate the impact of asymmetric shocks when adopting an external peg or designing the limits to place on central bank credit to government; the design of the governance structure of a central bank to avoid the potentially adverse effects caused by the hegemony of a dominant regional power; and the sequence of steps to follow in moving towards monetary union.
Our first suggestion is that when monetary unions adopt external pegs, these should be seen as Bretton Woods type arrangements which allow devaluation in cases of "fundamental disequilibria" rather than being immutable. This could potentially weaken the credibility enhancing effect of an exchange rate peg. Credibility should however be compensated by other institutional sources of credibility existing in a monetary union such as the independence of the regional central bank, the limits on central bank lending to governments, and the fact that within a union individual countries cannot devalue unilaterally.
A second suggestion is that countries should consider rules for central bank lending that minimize incentives for countries to engage in pro-cyclical policies during commodity days were over. Conversely, a country hit by negative terms of trade shock will be forced to proceed to an even greater real adjustment than would otherwise be required. One way to solve this would be for countries simply not to borrow up to their limit during good times so as to leave themselves more room for maneuver when negative shocks occur. In practice this has not happened in the CFA Zone since 1973, nor did it occur under the East African Currency Board.
One way to minimize this pro-cyclical aspect would be to set lending limits in terms of some absolute figure, but this would need to be regularly revised unless inflation was kept extremely low. Another possibility is that a counter-cyclical element could be integrated into rules limiting central bank lending. The direct credit ceiling could be initially determined as a proportion of either government revenue or some absolute figure and subsequently be raised or lowered in inverse proportion to a country's terms of trade index
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. At the same time, a minimum reserve requirement for a union's foreign reserves should be maintained as in the CFA Zone to ensure that the extension of credit to countries hit by adverse terms of trade shocks is covered by the potential savings accrued in other countries. This system would be more complex than simply setting limits for the stock of lending as a percentage of some aggregate, but it would be based on figures which are readily available and which would be difficult for governments to falsify. If necessary, intra-year adjustments to lending limits could also be made.
The experience of the CFA countries has also shown that limits only on direct central bank credit to government are not sufficient and should be extended to cover external borrowing and indirect credit, particularly in the absence of well-developed and liquid domestic financial markets. In that respect, Cottarelli's (1993) especially problematic to the extent that the larger country has low credibility and itself needs to be able to "tie its hands" through the regional arrangement. Adopting an external peg to a currency like the Euro would have the advantage of limiting the larger economy's capacity to dominate monetary policy, although as noted above this would also have certain disadvantages. Another possibility is to establish appropriate governance structures for regional central banks. In the CFA Zone, rules were overturned when the dominant country either chose the governor of the central bank (BCEAO) or was able to single-handedly block certain central bank board votes (BEAC). To guarantee independence for the central bank, we suggest a system where the dominant country in a union might nominate the governor, but this choice would then need to be unanimously approved by other members. The governor should also have a long period of office (say 8 to 10 years) and should not be re-appointable. Finally, were the monetary unions more closely linked to the EMU, an observer of the ECB with no voting power might sit on the board.
The third design issue involves the sequence of steps to follow for countries considering deepening their level of monetary integration. Past experience suggests that it is important to adopt a voluntary scheme on a country by country basis and to involve the private sector, two key elements of the current relative success of the Cross-Border Initiative. Pegging to an external currency might also put limits to the design of the scheme, thereby facilitating an agreement when one country dominates a region
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. Monetary integration should also be accompanied by the creation of an unified inter-bank market, the harmonization of payments systems, the abolition of exchange restrictions, and the adoption of a common regulatory and banking supervision authority, all of which are essential elements of a common monetary policy meant to rely increasingly on indirect instruments. As shown by the experience of the CFA countries, it is also important to realize that the establishment of a common market for goods and services need not to precede the creation a monetary union.
A final remark with regard to monetary unions involves the need for governments to provide more than just a stable macro-economic environment. As highlighted by the experience of CFA countries, rules can help governments to make a credible commitment to stable monetary and fiscal policies, but this does not necessary guarantee private investments large enough to lead to a higher growth path than if governments had 14 Given that the European Union is the main trading partner of African countries, pegging to the Euro is a natural choice. One could argue, however, that the main currency of reference for African export commodities is still the dollar. An intermediate solution might be to peg to a basket of currencies, but Ghosh et al. (1997) find that such pegs often provide less credibility.
attempted to fund development projects through seignorage. To the extent that there are other aspects of an economy which make investors wary, such as inadequate protection of property rights or inadequate infrastructure, investment will be deferred and no virtuous cycle will take place.
